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Abstract 
In recent years, the global demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG) as an energy source is 
increasing at a very fast rate. In order to meet this demand, a large number of facilities such 
as platforms, FPSO (floating production, storage and offloading), FSRU (floating storage and 
regasification unit) and LNG ships and terminals are required for the storage, processing and 
transportation of LNG. Failure of any of these facilities may expose the market, companies, 
personnel and the environment to hazards, hence making the application of risk analysis to 
the LNG sector a very topical issue throughout the world. To assess the risk of accidents 
associated with LNG facilities and carriers, various risk analysis approaches have been 
employed to identify the potential hazards, calculate the probability of accidents, as well as 
assessing the severity of consequences. Nonetheless, lit rature on classification of the risk 
analysis models applied to LNG facilities is very limited. Therefore, to reveal the holistic 
issues and future perspectives on risk analysis of LNG facilities, a systematic review of the 
current state-of-the-art research on LNG risk analysis is necessary. The aim of this paper is to 
review and categorize the published literature about the problems associated with risk 
analysis of LNG facilities, so as to improve the understanding of stakeholders (researchers, 
regulators, and practitioners). To achieve this aim, scholarly articles on LNG risk analysis are 
identified, reviewed, and then categorized according to risk assessment methods (qualitative, 
semi-qualitative or quantitative; deterministic or probabilistic; conventional or dynamic), 
tools (ETA, FTA, FMEA/FMECA, Bayesian network), outp t/strategy (RBI, RBM, RBIM, 
facility siting, etc.), data sources (OREDA handbook, published literature, UK HSE 
databases, regulatory agencies’ reports, industry datasets, and experts’ consultations), 
applications (LNG carriers and LNG fuelled ships, LNG terminals and stations, LNG 
offshore floating units, LNG plants), etc. Our study will not only be useful to researchers 
engaged in these areas but will also assist regulators, policy makers, and operators of LNG 
facilities to find the risk analysis models that fit their specific requirements. 
Keywords: Liquefied natural gas (LNG), hazard identification, risk analysis, risk 





Loss of control of combustible products such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) can result in 
accidents with catastrophic consequences such as fire and explosion. In order to mitigate such 
consequences, safety measures are required to be designed by asset managers in accordance 
with regulatory requirements. For this purpose, risk analysis has emerged as a very useful 
tool to guide decisions on design, manufacturing, istallation, operation and maintenance 
(O&M) and decommissioning of assets in safety critical ndustries. 
According to Aven (2016), the study of risk analysis as a scientific field started about 
30 to 40 years ago, hence making it a relatively young discipline. In spite of being a young 
discipline, risk analysis has been applied to a wide range of industries such as the medical 
sector, engineering infrastructure sector, transportati n sector, security and defence sector, 
social and the legal sector to find appropriate technical, safety, economic and environmental 
solutions to their problems (Aven, 2016). Historically, risk analysis may trace its root to the 
nuclear industry (Pasman, 2015). Information from the United States Regulatory Commission 
(2016) also indicates that the first probabilistic r sk assessment (PRA) technique was 
developed for a nuclear power plant in the 1970’s, and since then, many new methods and 
tools have been developed. Villa et al. (2016) indicated that the risk analysis approaches ar  
shifting from conventional approaches to more dynamic approaches, in order to enable 
decision makers continuously address operational, safety, economic and environmental 
challenges in safety critical industries. 
In the past few decades, some authors have attempted to review risk assessment 
methodologies and applications in different industrie . These studies are highlighted in the 
following: 
Siu (1994) presented an overview of a number of alternative risk assessment 
methodologies for dynamic systems. Khan and Abbasi (1998) presented a state-of-the-art-
review on techniques and methodologies for performing risk analysis in chemical process 
industries. Tixier et al. (2002) identified 62 papers published on risk analysis methodologies 
for industrial plants and then classified them into three different categories, including hazard 
identification, risk evaluation and risk hierarchisat on. Marhavilas et al. (2011) identified, 
analysed and categorized risk assessment methods that appeared in the literature between 
2000 and 2009. Pitblado and Woodward (2011) reviewed th  historical progress, the lessons 
learned, prediction models, and unresolved technical issues with regards to LNG risk 
analysis. Necci et al. (2015) critically analysed the available tools and knowledge gaps 
concerning domino effect assessment in chemical process and energy industries. Villa et al. 
(2016) provided a comprehensive review on dynamic risk assessment methodologies and 
relevant applications in the chemical process industry. 
Although the above-reviewed studies significantly contributed to the discipline of risk 
analysis, there still exist considerable gaps. Firstly, all articles focused on only one aspect of 
the risk analysis process, that is risk assessment thodology (Marhavilas et al., 2011; Necci 
et al., 2015; Tixier et al., 2002; Villa et al., 2016). Secondly, none of the articles focused on 
providing comprehensive review of risk analysis methodologies and application in the LNG 
sector. Thirdly, very few articles proposed a classification framework to categorize the 
published literature and report their findings. Despite the obvious progress made in the field 
of risk analysis, safety-related problems continue to be an issue in many safety critical 
industries (Knegtering and Pasman, 2009). Some examples of recent major incidents include 
the explosion in the Texas city refinery in March 2005; explosion of a natural gas condensate 
tank in Warffum, the Netherlands, in May 2005; fire at the Buncefield oil storage and transfer 
depot in December 2005; and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. 
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LNG is emerging as the preferred future fuel in many i dustries due to its higher 
efficiencies and less environmental concerns. This has led to significant growth in processing, 
storage and transportation of LNG in large volumes around the world. However, as LNG is a 
cryogenic fluid with vapour dispersion characteristics and thus highly flammable, the growth 
comes with additional health and safety challenges (Sun and Guo, 2013). Therefore, applying 
risk analysis in the LNG sector is crucial to securing the health, safety, security, and business 
success of companies. 
Though the application of risk analysis in the LNG sector continues to receive 
considerable attention from practitioners and researchers, yet some regulators and the general 
public remain unconvinced about the safety of LNG facilities, thus delaying the expansion of 
existing facilities as well as preventing the construction of new facilities in some countries. 
To reveal the holistic issues and future perspectivs on LNG safety, comprehensive and 
systematic literature review of current state-of-the art research on application of risk analysis 
technologies in the LNG sector is increasingly becoming important. The aim of this paper is 
to review and categorize the literature published about the problems associated with risk 
analysis in the LNG sector, so as to improve the understanding of stakeholders (researchers, 
regulators, and practitioners). This also covers other aspects of risk management process, 
which may be missing in previous review studies. The reviewed literature will be classified 
according to risk assessment methods (qualitative, s mi-qualitative or quantitative; 
deterministic or probabilistic; conventional or dynamic), tools (ETA, FTA, FMEA/FMECA, 
Bayesian network), output/strategy (RBI, RBM, RBIM, facility siting, etc.), data sources 
(OREDA handbook, published literature, UK HSE databses, regulatory agencies’ reports, 
industry datasets, and experts’ consultations), applications (LNG carriers and LNG fuelled 
ships, LNG terminals and stations, LNG offshore floating units, LNG plants), etc. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the review 
methodology as well as the framework used for classifying the published literature on 
application of risk analysis in the LNG sector. The details of the observations and findings of 
the classification framework are presented in Section 3, and the findings of the literature 
review will be discussed in Section 4. Finally, several gaps in current knowledge regarding 
the subject are mentioned and some recommendations for future research are provided in 
Section 5. 
2. Classification process 
2.1. Search and review methodology 
The number of peer reviewed articles and conference papers which have employed risk 
analysis approaches in the LNG sector has seen an icrease in the past two decades. The 
distribution of the number of papers is displayed in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Distribution of the number of papers over the past two decades. 
 
The search and review process used in this paper is explained as follows: First, several 
academic databases were identified to search the lierature. These databases included 
ScienceDirect, ISI Web of Science, EBSCOhost, Emerald, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, 
ProQuest, SpringerLink, Taylor and Francis, Wiley, Inderscience, Interscience, American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) digital collection, Onepetro and Google scholar. 
These databases were selected because they hold the argest coverage of scientific peer-
reviewed literature in relation to the LNG sector. Second, two keywords of  “LNG” and 
“risk” were used in combination with other terms such as “analysis”, “assessment”, 
“methodology”, “approach”, “tool”, “technique”, “management”, “mitigation” and “strategy” 
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to identify the literature relevant to the topic. To achieve the highest level of relevance, only 
peer reviewed papers written in English and published in top-tier international journals and 
conference proceedings were considered. This means th t Master’s and doctoral dissertations, 
textbooks, book chapters, technical reports, working papers and lecture notes were excluded 
from this review. Third, some exclusion and inclusion criteria were used by authors to screen 
and select the relevant papers for this review. In this regard, the authors first screened the 
titles and abstracts of the identified papers and then excluded those studies which did not 
cover any of the themes captured in the classification framework (see Figure 2) were 
excluded. The keywords search resulted in a total of 125 documents, among which 66 
documents were found relevant after applying the exclusion and inclusion criteria. 
After critically scrutinizing the identified literature, our analysis resulted in 47 journal 
articles (Shindo et al., 2000; Kim et al., 2005; Ochiai et al., 2005; Ronza et al., 2006; Han et 
al., 2008; Vanem et al., 2008; Raj and Lemoff, 2009; Yun et al., 2009; Nwaoha et al., 2010; 
Vinnem, 2010; Nwaoha et al., 2011; Parihar et al., 2011; Tanabe and Miyake, 2011; 
Keshavarz et al., 2012; Khalil et al., 2012; Li and Huang, 2012; Rathnayaka et al., 2012; 
Berle et al., 2013; Chu et al., 2013; Nwaoha et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2013; Aneziris et al., 
2014; Dan et al., 2014; Elsayed et al., 2014; Martins et al., 2014; Mcinerney et al., 2014; 
Noh et al., 2014; Vianello and Maschio, 2014a; Vianello and Maschio, 2014b; Ahmed et al., 
2015; Giardina and Morale, 2015; Lee t al., 2015; Martinez and Lambert, 2015; Fu et al., 
2016; Martins et al., 2016; Yeo et al., 2016; Ahn et al., 2017; Jeong et al., 2017; Renjith et 
al., 2018; Baalisampang et al., 2019; Badida et al., 2019; George et al., 2019; Kong et al., 
2019; Li and Tang, 2019; Sultana et al., 2019; Yoon et al., 2019; Leoni et al., 2019) and 19 
conference papers (Dogliani, 2002; Bozzolsco, 2005; Ballesio et al., 2009; Spitzenberger, 
2009; Kolodziej et al., 2009; Chin and Saetren, 2010; Montewka et al., 2010; Skramstad et 
al., 2010; Roldán et al., 2012; Souza et al., 2012; Benyessaad et al., 2013; Chu et al., 2014; 
Devkaran, 2014; Melani et al. (2014); Hamedifar et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2015; Jewitt, 2016; 
Stavrou et al., 2016; Hogelin et al., 2018). 
2.2 Classification framework 
In order to classify and analyse the literature for risk analysis in the LNG sector, we propose 
a classification framework that is shown in Figure 2. While reviewing the literature, we found 
that the application of risk analysis in LNG facilities can be categorized into five different 
themes, as explained below. 
• Risk analysis methods (qualitative, semi-qualitative or quantitative; deterministic or 
probabilistic; conventional or dynamic). 
• Risk analysis tools (Checklist, HAZOP, LOPA, ETA, FTA, FMEA/FMECA, Petri 
Network (PN), MCDM, Bayesian Network (BN), fuzzy set theory, Markov chain, 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD), hybrid methods). 
• Output/strategy (Risk assessment, safety analysis, RBI RBM, RBIM, facility siting, 
etc.). 
• Data sources (historical data, OREDA handbook, experimental data, UK HSE databases, 
published literature, software tools and expert judgment).  
• Applications (LNG carriers and LNG fuelled ships, LNG terminals and stations, LNG 
offshore floating units, LNG plants). 
 
Figure 2. Classification framework for risk analysis in the LNG sector. 
The above five categories were arrived at by initially identifying, reviewing and 
analysing scholarly and industrial contributions reported in scientific journals and conference 
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proceedings. The classification framework was subsequently validated by experts including 
academics with several publications and years of experience in the field of risk analysis. 
3. Classification of studies, observations and findings 
Based on the systematic literature review and content analysis of the selected publications, 
the result of each category of the classification framework is reported in below: 
3.1 Risk analysis methods 
Many risk analysis methodologies have been developed and applied by researchers as a 
decision support tool, by providing descriptions of risk, in many fields. The main principles 
of risk analysis methodologies include: establishment of context, identification of hazard, 
calculation of failure frequencies, evaluation of cnsequences, and calculation of risk. Tixier 
et al. (2002) classified the published literature into qualitative and quantitative risk analysis 
methodologies. Villa et al. (2016) reviewed papers published on quantitative rsk analysis 
methodologies in the chemical process industry. In this paper, we have classified the risk 
analysis methodologies according to the following criteria:  
- Qualitative, quantitative, or semi-qualitative (semi-qualitative methods may also be 
referred to as hybrid methods). 
- Deterministic, probabilistic, or hybrid deterministic-probabilistic. 
- Conventional or dynamic. 
Qualitative risk assessment is the most commonly used methodology to estimate 
uncertainties in many safety critical industries (for example, assessing the condition of safety 
barriers). According to Nwaoha et al. (2013), qualitative risk analysis methodology is a 
deductive method relying on the subjective judgements of experts as input information. It is 
perceived to be the quickest and simplest method amongst the risk analysis methodologies, 
since it requires little or no use of mathematical and computational skills. The results of the 
qualitative risk analysis methodologies are often rpresented by colour indicators. For 
instance, ‘red’ colour represents ‘high risk’ or unacceptable risk, meaning it is absolutely 
necessary to take steps to eliminate or reduce failure risk. ‘Yellow’ (or ‘amber’) colour 
represents ‘medium risk’, meaning that already existing risk reduction strategies can be used 
to manage the risks. ‘Green’ colour represents ‘lowrisk’, meaning it is almost unnecessary to 
take any action.  
On the other hand, quantitative risk analysis is a systematic approach for identifying 
and quantifying potential accident probabilities and consequences using mathematical and 
computational models. According to Marhavilas et al. (2011), the application of quantitative 
risk analysis methods ensure that risk is estimated in quantity by utilizing simulation or 
experimental approaches or applying real life information as input information. Unlike the 
qualitative risk analysis, the results of a quantittive risk assessment are benchmarked against 
established quantitative risk acceptance criteria such as fatal accident rate (FAR) and/or 
individual risk (IR). Most international regulations require the use of quantitative risk 
assessment methodologies to support decision-making process for siting of industrial 
facilities with catastrophic failure consequences (Center for Chemical Process Safety 
(CCPS), 1999; National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 59A, 2013). Simulation and 
operational research (OR) methods are widely used in quantitative risk analysis projects. For 
more on the requirements for performing quantitative risk analysis, the readers can refer to 
NORSOK Standard Z-013 (2010) set by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(https://www.npd.no/en/), as well as ISO 31000 (2009). 
The semi-qualitative risk analysis is a hybrid of the qualitative and quantitative risk 
analysis methodologies. This is because both qualitative and quantitative risk analysis 
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techniques have limitations, therefore in order to compensate for the limitations of each 
method, subjective inputs from experts are combined with quantitative risk analysis. This 
method is suitable when objective failure data are unavailable or insufficient. Berle t al. 
(2013) suggested that semi-qualitative methods employ quantitative techniques, however they 
do not utilize exact numbers for probability calculation or consequence assessment. When 
using semi qualitative methods, a Likert scale of 1-5 is often assigned to the probability of a 
risk occurring. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), failure mode, effect and criticality 
analysis (FMECA), hazard and operability (HAZOP) and Bayesian networks (BNs) are 
typical examples of semi qualitative risk analysis methods.  
Risk analysis methods can also be classified as deterministic, probabilistic or a 
combination of deterministic and probabilistic (Tixier et al. 2002). Deterministic risk analysis 
approaches are used to evaluate the impact of a single hazardous event by determining the 
damage consequences, whereas probabilistic risk analysis methods are used to either evaluate 
the probability of an undesirable event or evaluate simultaneously its probability and 
consequences. 
In addition to the above-mentioned categories of risk analysis methods, this review 
further classifies the methods into conventional risk analysis (CRA) and dynamic risk 
analysis (DRA) methods. Over the past two decades, CRAs have widely been applied to 
evaluate the risk of safety critical systems. Nonetheless, CRA procedures do have some 
major drawbacks (Khan and Abbasi, 1998). These include: unavailability of good quality data 
for the analysis, large set of uncertainties introduced to the decision-making process, rigid 
nature of the process, and the inability of decision-makers to update the overall risk 
assessments by taking into account new information due to dynamic nature of complex 
systems. In order to address these drawbacks, recent studies have geared toward the use of 
DRAs to support risk-based decision making (Villa et al. 2016). Also, the flexibility in the 
application of DRA methods for risk analysis makes them inherently superior to CRA 
methods, since decision makers will be able to continuously update the risk levels with new 
information. The use of DRA in safety critical industries such as the LNG sector can enhance 
safe operation and ensure well informed decision making in critical areas such as 
maintenance.  
DRA methods have been applied to support the following activities in different safety 
critical industries: 
- modelling dynamic situations and identification of missing accident scenarios 
(Swaminathan and Smidts, 1999a, 1999b); 
- dynamic fault tree and event tree analyses (Cepin and Mavko, 2002; Bucci et al., 2008); 
- proposing dynamic risk assessment frameworks (Meel et al., 2007; Meel and Seider, 
2008); 
- refinery accident modelling (Kalantarnia et al., 2010); 
- LNG tanker manoeuvring (Montewka et al., 2010); 
- LNG dispersion risk assessment strategies (Sun et al., 2013); 
- offshore oil and gas drilling (Abimbola et al., 2014); and 
- LNG carrier loading operation (Melani et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, DRA has been applied to several risk analysis case studies involving 
facilities such as Ethyl Benzene process plant (Meel and Seider, 2008), LNG importation 
terminals (Yun et al., 2009), LNG Jetty (Chin and Saetren, 2010), process safety alarm 
systems (Pariyani et al., 2012a, 2012b), LNG transportation systems (Berle t al., 2013), 
regasification system (Martins et al., 2014), LNG fuel storage tanks (Noh et al., 2014), LNG 
carrier anchoring system (Zhao et al., 2015), loading arms for LNG (Stavrou et al., 2016), 




The distribution of the journal articles and conference papers about risk analysis 
methodologies in the LNG sector is shown in Table 1. As can be seen, there are five papers 
which employed qualitative risk analysis methods, 32 papers used quantitative risk analysis 
methods and 27 papers applied semi-qualitative risk analysis methods. It is evident from 
Table 1 that the number of papers utilizing quantittive risk analysis methods in the LNG 
sector has been increasing since 2000. This is then followed by the application of semi-
qualitative and qualitative methods. This then emphasizes the point that quantitative risk 
analysis methods are recommended for risk and safety analysis in most safety critical 
industries. 
Table 1. Distribution of the papers utilizing risk analysis methodologies. 
It is evident from Table 1 that probabilistic risk analysis methods have been extensively 
used in the LNG sector. Among the papers reviewed under this category, 29 papers utilized 
probabilistic risk analysis methods, 27 papers used deterministic methods, and 6 papers used 
a combined deterministic-probabilistic approach.  
The distribution of the papers utilizing conventional and dynamic risk analysis by year 
of publication is given in Table 2. The results indicate that the most popular type of risk 
assessment method in the LNG sector is CRA (48 papers), whereas DRA is gradually gaining 
popularity.  
Table 2. Distribution of the papers utilizing conventional and dynamic risk analysis. 
3.2 Risk analysis tools  
Over the past two decades, several risk analysis tool have been developed to support risk-
based decision making in various industries. In what follows, the most commonly used risk 
analysis tools are briefly described. 
3.2.1 Checklist 
This is one of the common approaches used in identifying hazards and risk exposure. 
Checklists are mainly developed based on accumulative knowledge and judgment of experts 
as well as information gained from previous projects. In risk analysis, checklist is known as 
the simplest and fastest way of identifying potential hazards. It involves asking series of 
questions and providing answers in a structured andsystematic manner. The main 
characteristics of this tool include:  
• it mostly produces qualitative outcomes; 
• data collection process involves the use of interview, field visit and review of project 
documents; 
• it requires well-trained individuals who understand checklist questions. 
Though it is a simple tool, it has its own unique challenges such as: (i) team members 
have to spend a lot of time to review and trim down questions when they are no longer 
relevant to a project, (ii) since it relies on experience of individuals in developing questions, 
this introduces uncertainties into the final results, (iii) the results of checklist are mostly 
subjective or qualitative. In order to overcome these challenges, it is suggested to combine 
this tool with other risk analysis tools in the LNG sector. 
3.2.2 Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) 
This is a structured and systematic qualitative risk a sessment tool for evaluating risk in 
industrial plants. It is a bottom-up approach used to identify potential hazards and deviation 
in operations that are likely to result in accidents and non-compliance. HAZOP is 
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accomplished by brainstorming and using a set of special guide words (e.g. none, more of, 
less of, part of, more than, etc.) (Marhavilas et al., 2011). One of the key uniqueness of this 
tool is that it brings out the imaginative abilities of team members when considering design 
intent, and operational and process deviations. The deviations are determined based on the 
experience of the project team, including a team leader, engineers, risk analysts, material 
specialists, operators, designers, and original equipment manufacturer (OEM), as well as 
historical information. HAZOP can be used to assess the risk of safety systems from different 
perspectives. Some of the advantages of this risk analysis tool are: (i) it is helpful when 
confronted with risks that are difficult to quantify, (ii ) decision makers are not compelled to 
assign numerical values to probability of occurrence and severity of consequences, (iii ) risks 
are not ranked, (iv) it has brainstorming built into its application, and (v) it is simple 
compared to other risk assessment tools. On the other hand, the main disadvantage of this risk 
analysis tool is its inability to assess risks in a multi component system where different 
components interact with each other. 
3.2.3 Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) 
This is a straightforward and simplified semi-quantit tive tool applied in risk analysis to 
obtain quantitative results. As compared to other risk analysis tools, quantitative results are 
obtained with less effort and time (Yun et al., 2009). In risk analysis, LOPA provides the 
basis for determining whether there are enough protective systems or safety features against 
hazardous events so as to reduce their risk. For LOPA procedure, the frequency of initiating 
event, consequences of failure, and likelihood of failure of protection layers are calculated to 
determine the level of risk for any given accident scenario. The main steps for performing 
LOPA are: (i) describe the accident scenario under investigation, (ii ) identify initiating event 
and assign frequency to initiating event, (iii ) identify consequence severity levels, (iv) decide 
on the requirements for risk reduction measures using risk matrix, (v) identify layers of 
protection, (vi) determine the probability of failure on demand for each layer of protection 
and mathematically combine them, (vii) determine the combined risk, (vii) compare the 
combined risk reduction effectiveness of the identified protection layers with the risk 
reduction requirement to determine whether additional risk reduction is needed. Depending 
on the severity of consequences of potential accidents, one or many protective layers will be 
required to prevent the accident from happening. For further details on procedures and 
application of LOPA, readers can refer to AIChE (2001) and Willey (2014). 
3.2.4 Event tree analysis (ETA) 
Event tree analysis (ETA) involves the use of logic models to determine all possible 
outcomes from accident scenarios (initiating events) that may lead to equipment failure or 
process disruption. ETA can be used to identify all potential accidental events and processes 
in a complex system. The main steps for performing ETA are: (i) identify all relevant 
initiating events that may result in an unacceptable risk, (ii ) identify all safety measures 
needed to reduce the risk, (iii ) construct event tree, (iv) describe the potential accidental 
sequences, (v) assign probabilities to each event sequence, (vi) calculate the probability of 
system’s success and failure by multiplying the probabilities of individual event sequences. 
ETA has several advantages compared to other risk analysis tools. Rausand and 
Hoyland (2004) suggested that ETA produces a graphic l representation of sequence of 
events after an accident. Also, ETA is suitable for evaluating multiple failures in complex and 
dynamic systems. On the other hand, the inability to analyse multiple initiating events or 
safety incidents at a time is a limitation of ETA. 
3.2.5 Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
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This is one of the well-structured and widely used risk assessment tools for root cause 
analysis (RCA) of complex systems. It was first introduced by AT&T’s Bell Laboratories in 
1962 for a ballistic control system. FTA is a deductive failure analysis tool used by safety 
analyst to identify possible causes of system failure or process disruption before they occur 
(Kabir, 2017). In FTA, failure analysis of systems starts with a top event and works 
backwards toward determining the potential causes of top event. FTA produces graphical 
display by showing logical connection between failure and the path toward the failure of a 
system. The main steps for constructing a fault tree include: (i) definition of the system, (ii ) 
definition of the top-level faults, (iii ) identification of the potential causes for the top-level 
fault, (iv) identification of the next level event, (v) identification of root causes, (vi) 
assignment of probabilities to event, (vii) analysis of fault tree. 
FTA can be used to analyse the faults in either a qu litative, quantitative or semi-
qualitative way. The qualitative approach involves r ducing the fault tree to a minimum set of 
events, whereas the quantitative approach requires calculating the probability of occurrence 
for the top event by means of statistical or analytical techniques. The probability of 
occurrence is estimated using quantitative information from each component. This 
information may include reliability and maintainability data such as failure probability, 
failure rate, and repair rate of a system. 
One of the key advantages of FTA is that it helps decision makers identify the most 
critical components in a system so as to plan the most effective method of maintaining them 
(Kabir, 2017). Nonetheless, the conventional FTA is more suitable for safety and reliability 
analysis of those components experiencing single fai ure mode and exhibiting static failure 
behaviour throughout the life cycle. However, most f the modern complex industrial 
systems suffer from multiple failure modes and exhibit dynamic failure behaviour. Therefore, 
conventional FTA tool is unable to deal with dynamic failure behaviour of complex systems 
(Kabir, 2017). The inability of conventional FTA todeal with uncertainties in failure data is 
also another limitation. In order to overcome these limitation, some studies have extended the 
conventional FTA to dynamic fault tree (DFT) (Cepin a d Mavko, 2002; Rao et al., 2009; 
Boudali et al., 2010), state/event fault tree (Kaiser et al., 2007) and stochastic hybrid fault 
tree automaton (SHyFTA) (see Chiacchio et al., 2016). 
3.2.6 Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) / Failure mode, effects and criticality 
analysis (FMECA) 
This is one of the most common inductive risk analysis tools used by safety analysts to 
investigate the potential failure modes, causes and effects of components failure in complex 
systems within different safety critical industries. The ability of decision makers to come up 
with possible ways of eliminating or minimizing poten ial failure modes of a system in order 
to enhance operational safety and reliability of the system is an added advantage for using 
FMEA. The procedure for using the tool starts with defining the system to be analysed, 
breaking it down into subsystems and components, identifying the potential failure modes 
and possible causes, determining the current controls (or solutions) to detect or prevent the 
causes, followed by evaluating the effect of failures on the system. For quantitative analysis, 
numerical values based on an agreed scale are assigned to probability of occurrence (O), 
severity of occurrence (S) and non-detectability (D). The Risk-Priority-Number (RPN) is then 
calculated by:  
DSORPN ××= .                                                                                                          (1) 
For further details on the procedures for conducting FMEA, the readers can refer to 
Shafiee et al. (2019). Despite the increase in FMEA application in safety critical industries, 
several of its limitations have been identified and reported in the literature over the years (e.g. 
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see Dinmohammadi and Shafiee, 2013; Shafiee and Dinmohammadi, 2014; Kabir and 
Papadopoulos, 2018). One of the most important limiations is the subjective nature of input 
data for O, S and D. These three factors are often determined based on experts’ judgement, 
which usually reduces the degree of confidence in RPN results for decision making. Also, the 
issue of why different factors should be considered equally important has been reported in the 
literature.  
FMEA was initially called ‘failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA)’. 
The ‘C’ in FMECA indicates that the criticality of the various failure effects are considered 
and ranked. Therefore, FMECA is a kind of FMEA with criticality analysis. In FMEA, 
multiple failure analysis levels are possible, however, FMECA does not account for multiple 
failure interactions, meaning that each failure is considered individually. For this reason, 
industries are not very sincere to perform FMECA after performing FMEA. 
3.2.7 Petri Network (PN) 
This is a graphical and mathematical modelling tool that is applicable for risk analysis of 
dynamic complex systems. Murata (1989) indicated that PN is a promising tool for describing 
those systems characterised as concurrent, asynchronous, distributed, parallel, 
nondeterministic, and/or stochastic. PN offers the advantage of representing time sequence of 
events along with their durations (Lee and Lu, 2012). It uses two types of nodes, called places 
and transitions. The places interact with the transitions by connecting with directed arcs or 
vice versa (Kabir et al., 2015). In PN, systems are graphically constructed as a set of 
conditions and events, where places represent conditi s and transitions represent events. 
Circles are used to graphically represent the places which may contain tokens, whereas 
rectangles are used to represent transitions. The token in a place is also referred to as marking 
of the place. The token represents the set of initial conditions and this changes by the firing of 
transitions, which denote occurrence of event. 
3.2.8 Multi criteria decision-making (MCDM)  
Risk analysis of safety critical systems can be considered as a MCDM problem. This is 
because the risk analysis may involve multiple (both quantifiable and non-quantifiable) 
conflicting criteria, thus making it a complex decision-making problem. In tackling such 
complex decision-making problem, the application of MCDM is considered appropriate. In 
the literature, various MCDM tools such as Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), Analytic 
Network Process (ANP), Elimination and Choice Expressing Reality (ELECTRE), Technique 
of Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Soluti n (TOPSIS), Preference Ranking 
Organization METHod for Enrichment of Evaluations (PROMETHEE), Vlsekriterijumska 
Optimizacija I KOmpromisno Resenje (VIKOR), etc. have been applied in different 
industries for different purposes. However, only one paper was found to have used fuzzy 
TOPSIS method for evaluating the risks related to LNG plant. A wide summary on MCDM 
methods can be found in Shafiee (2015) and Shafiee et al. (2019).  
3.2.9 Bayesian network (BN) 
This is a directed graphical model and a well-known structured interference tool which is 
very useful for dealing with uncertainty in risk and reliability decision-making process, 
combining information from different sources, and updating the results when new 
information becomes available (Langseth and Portinale, 2007). It is also useful for updating 
maintenance plans when operating conditions dramatically change. The main aim of BN is to 
model the posterior conditional probability distribution of the final outcome (often causal) of 
a system after obtaining new information. According to Rausand (2011), BN establishes a 
relationship between the causes and the final outcome f a system. A deeper insight into the 
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application of BN is provided by Neapolitan (2004), Langseth and Portinale (2007) and 
Barber (2012). Many researchers consider BN as a suit ble and promising tool to deal with 
uncertainties during risk analysis of dynamic complex systems such as LNG facilities. 
3.2.10 Fuzzy set theory 
One of the major limitations in risk analysis projects is the difficulty in obtaining good 
quality failure data for quantitative assessment due to paucity of statistical information about 
failure of subsystems and components. The insufficiency of good quality data is mostly 
addressed by the use of expert judgement or using data from similar systems or the use of 
generic data. However, the use of expert judgement and generic data can introduce higher 
degree of uncertainty, vagueness, and imprecision in the final risk assessment results. To deal 
with the uncertainty, vagueness and imprecision associated with the classical risk assessment 
tools, fuzzy set theory was developed. When applying fuzzy set theory, the uncertainty, 
imprecision and vagueness associated with human judgement are represented by linguistic 
scales (Shafiee, 2015; Animah, 2018).  
The triangular fuzzy number (TFN) and the trapezoidal fuzzy number (TZFN) have 
been widely used for risk and reliability analysis of industrial plants. Let x, a1, b1, c1, d1 ∈ R. 
A triangular fuzzy numbers is defined by three numbers expressed as (a1, b1, c1), where a1 ≤ 
b1 ≤ c1 represent the lower bound, mean bound and upper bound, respectively. The fuzzy 
membership function )(~ xaµ  is a continuous function defined on a closed interval [0, 1], and 
its mathematical function is expressed as: 
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Similarly, the trapezoidal fuzzy numbers can be defined by four numbers expressed as 
(a1, b1, c1, d1), and its membership function is given by: 
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Over the years, fuzzy set theory has been combined with classical risk assessment tools 
to produce fuzzy based risk assessment methodologies for assessing the risk and reliability of 
complex systems in safety critical industries. Fuzzy ETA (Kenarangui, 1991; Fu et al., 2018), 
fuzzy FTA (Yuhua and Datao, 2005; Yazdi et al., 2017; Moeinedini et al., 2018; Piadeh et al., 
2018), fuzzy FMEA (Baykasoğlu and Gölcük, 2017; Karatop and Sinan, 2017; Orouei and 
Jahan, 2017), fuzzy BN, fuzzy PN (Chang et al., 2018; Zhou and Reniers, 2017; Zhou et al., 
2017; Zhou et al., 2017) and fuzzy Markov chain (Fu et al., 2012) are examples of the 
common fuzzy based risk assessment tools. 
3.2.11 Markov chain model 
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This is a sophisticated quantitative method based on iagrammatic modelling which allows 
for inclusion of transitions between different states. This approach is suitable for modelling 
the risk of dynamic systems. A Markov chain describes a system whose state changes over 
time. The changes can be modelled by probability distributions with a simple sort of 
dependence structure, where the conditional distribution of future states of the system 
depends only on its present state and not at all on its past states. According to Kabir and 
Papadopoulos (2018), information such as components’ failure modes, failure sequence and 
spare parts availability can also be incorporated into Markov model for safety and reliability 
analysis, where the failure or repair rate of components denote the transition rates. 
3.2.12 Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) 
The use of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) as a risk analysis tool is gaining popularity 
in the LNG sector. This is because CFD models can take different factors such as wind speed, 
wind direction, leak rate, location of leaks, path of release and other obstacles into account 
for risk evaluation. In addition, CFD models are suitable when a comprehensive risk analysis 
study with sensitivity analysis is required. In the application of CFD for risk analysis, a 
number of mathematical models are formulated. These models combine the probability of 
failure of an event and its corresponding consequences with environmental factors to evaluate 
the risk. The use of this powerful tool does not only enable LNG facilities to set the 
appropriate safety tolerance limits for accident events during siting and operations but also 
can provide decision makers with appropriate information for risk reduction. 
3.2.13 Hybrid decision making tools 
Majority of the individual risk analysis tools have practical limitations. In order to overcome 
the limitations of the individual tools and enhance th ir performance, some studies have 
integrated two or more individual risk analysis tools. Some of the common hybrid risk 
analysis tools used in the LNG sector include: combined FTA and ETA, check list and 
FMEA, ETA and PHAST simulation (https://www.usgs.gov/software/phast-a-computer-
program-simulating-groundwater-flow-solute-transport-and-multicomponent), Bayesian–
LOPA, non-linear finite element method (FEM) and BN, formal safety assessment (FSA) and 
fuzzy evidential reasoning (FER), FTA and cause-consequence diagram, risk matrix and FER 
and FTA, dynamic process simulation and Monte Carlo method, FMECA and HAZOP, ETA 
and CFD, etc.  
The results of the review for risk analysis tools are shown in Table 3. The results 
indicate that majority of the papers have applied integrated risk analysis tools (19 out of 66), 
followed by individual risk analysis tools (18 out of 66) and then fuzzy-based analysis tools 
(7 out of 66). The rest of the papers were not clear on the type of tools they used for risk 
analysis. Among the individual risk analysis tools, ETA was found to be the most commonly 
used tool, followed by BN and CFD, whereas Markov chain method and PN have been rarely 
used for risk analysis in the LNG sector. 
3.3 Data sources 
In order to make appropriate decision, risk analysts requires good quality quantitative and 
qualitative data. In many cases, these data are obtained from some popular sources such as 
OREDA handbook, UK HSE databases, regulatory agencies’ reports, industry datasets, and 
experts’ consultations. In what follows, some of the popular data sources used for risk 
analysis in the LNG sector are briefly described. 
3.3.1 Offshore and onshore reliability data (OREDA) 
The OREDA database (https://www.oreda.com/) contains high quality reliability data 
collected from both offshore and onshore oil and gas equipment over a period of time. The 
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reliability information in OREDA handbook has been used by researchers, practitioners, 
scholars and other stakeholders in the oil and gas industry in order to evaluate the reliability, 
availability, maintainability (RAM) of safety, production and environmental critical systems. 
There are two volumes of the handbook, volume 1 presents information on topside equipment 
and volume 2 presents information on subsea equipment. Since the beginning of the OREDA 
project in the 80’s, six different editions of the andbook have been published; 1984 (1st 
edition), 1992 (2nd edition), 1997 (3rd edition), 200  (4th edition), 2009 (5th edition) and 
2015 (6th edition). The structure of the newest ediion published in 2015 includes two parts. 
The first part describes the OREDA project and the second part presents the data collection 
process as well as the procedures employed to obtain the reliability data. 
3.3.2 Pipeline and riser loss of containment (PARLOC) 
Over the years, the pipeline and riser loss of containment (PARLOC) database 
(https://oilandgasuk.co.uk/parloc/) has become a preferred source of information for risk 
assessment of pipelines and risers in the oil and gs industry. It contains data on generic loss 
of containment incidents that have occurred on pipelines and risers in the UK continental 
shelf (UKCS). PARLOC data can help designers and operators to validate design and 
operational safety requirements for pipelines in the LNG sector. 
3.3.3 UK HSE databases  
The UK HSE databases (http://www.hse.gov.uk/pesticides/topics/databases.htm) contain 
details of equipment used in the petroleum industry and their corresponding failure rates and 
event data for risk assessment. The failure rate and event data present in these databases are 
generic, since they are obtained from risk assessment tools. In the absence of failure rate data 
for some specific systems or components, the information contained in the failure rate and 
event document can be a good starting point for risk analysis in the LNG sector.  
3.3.4 Experts’ consultations 
Risk analysts require the use of good quality data for decision making with high degree of 
confidence. However, in some instances, when the required data is not available, limited or 
difficult to collect, experts’ judgements become thonly source of information. The experts’ 
judgement is based on the knowledge and experience of xperts in a particular field. 
Elicitation of experts’ opinion is the frequent method used to obtain data. According to 
Rosqvist (2003), the elicitation process requires the use of decision makers, facilitators, 
normative experts, domain experts and stakeholders. In order to obtain the required data 
through the elicitation process, there should be a structured interaction (i.e. face to face, 
telephone, etc.) between the facilitator and experts. In the LNG sector, failure modes and 
causes, failure rates, mean time to failure (MTTF), economic impact of incidents, type of 
model to be used for analysis as well as interpreting data from sensors are examples of data 
that may be obtained through experts’ consultations f r risk assessment. For more details on 
how to use experts’ judgement for risk assessment, s e Mayer and Booker (1991). 
From Table 3, we observe that several databases have been used for risk analysis in the 
LNG sector. Out of 59 papers reviewed under this category, eight papers utilized historical 
data, 11 papers relied on experts’ judgments, one pap r used experimental data, three papers 
utilized reliability data, one paper used data from software packages, 4 papers applied 
OREDA dataset, two papers used datasets in safety organizations, one paper combined data 
from literature with experts’ judgment, and four papers utilized generic data from published 
literature and industry reports. In addition, ten studies used data from two or more databases 
for their analysis and the rest of the studies did not indicate the source of the data used in 




While reviewing the literature, we found that risk analysis methodologies and tools in the 
LNG sector have been applied as a decision support to l for risk assessment, risk-based 
maintenance (RBM) strategy, risk-based inspection (RBI) strategy, risk-based inspection and 
maintenance (RBIM) strategy, risk verification strategy, safety analysis, shutdown strategy, 
availability estimation, accident modelling, hazard ranking, etc.  
The results of the review for risk analysis outputs and strategies are shown in Table 3. 
39 papers proposed methods for risk assessment, whereas the rest of the papers proposed 
methods for safety analysis, risk verification, risk reduction, risk-based shutdown 
management strategy, RBM, accident modelling, hazard r nking, risk-based availability 
estimation, dynamic risk failure monitoring, risk-based design, corrosion protection and 
maintenance optimization. 
Table 3. Output, analysis tools and data sources 
3.5 Applications 
LNG as fuel is used in wide range of safety critical ndustries with additional responsibility of 
environmental management being core to their operations. This study identified four different 
subsectors in the LNG sector that have reported conucting risk assessments for their own 
systems or assets. These include: LNG carriers and LNG fuelled ships, LNG terminals and 
stations, LNG offshore floating units, and LNG plants. In what follows, the most important 
publications in each subsector are briefly reviewed. 
3.5.1 LNG carriers and LNG fuelled ships 
Han et al. (2008) performed structural risk analysis of Gaz Transport/Technigas (GTT) NO96 
membrane-type LNG carriers operating from the Baltic Sea to Quebec, Canada. Vanem et al. 
(2008) presented a risk assessment model to support o e ations of sea-going LNG carriers. 
Montewka et al. (2010) calculated the collision risk between an LNG tanker and a harbour 
tug during mooring operations. Nwaoha et al. (2010) developed a genetic algorithm (GA) to 
model the cost of maintenance and repair of LNG carrier systems. Nwaoha et al. (2011) 
investigated the risk levels of LNG carrier systems by means of fuzzy evidential reasoning 
method. Parihar et al. (2011) applied CFD dispersion methodology to perform consequence 
analysis for an LNG deepwater port facility. Li and Huang (2012) evaluated the fire and 
explosion risk associated with LNG ships. Roldán et al. (2012) presented a risk-based 
approach to analyse the failure modes and consequences associated with cargo handling 
operation of LNG carrier. Berle et al. (2013) addressed the vulnerability in maritime 
transportation system by applying the formal vulnerability assessment approach using 
quantitative data. The approach was illustrated using a maritime LNG transportation system. 
Nwaoha et al. (2013) developed a new framework by combining riskmatrix and FER method 
to identify and rank hazards associated with LNG carrier operations. Elsayed et al. (2014) 
used a fuzzy TOPSIS methodology to assess the risk of LNG carriers. Melani et al. (2014) 
applied BN to support risk-based analysis of LNG carrier operations. Noh et al. (2014) 
developed a risk-based approach by combining dynamic process method with Monte Carlo 
simulation to determine the risk of LNG fuel storage tanks in LNG-fuelled ships. Lee et al. 
(2015) assessed and compared the fire risk of two types of LNG fuel gas supply (FGS) 
systems used in marine vessels. Zhao et al. (2015) applied BN to assess the risk of accidents 
in LNG carrier anchoring system. Fu et al. (2016) proposed a quantitative risk assessment 
framework for determining the potential risk of leakage events in LNG-fueled vessels. Ahn et 
al. (2017) applied a fuzzy-based FMEA to conduct risk analysis of hybrid systems possessing 
an MCFC (molten carbonate fuel cell) and a gas turbine for marine propulsion. Jeong et al. 
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(2017) adopted probabilistic risk assessment approaches to determine the safety exclusion 
zone for LNG bunkering stations on LNG-fuelled ships. Souza et al. (2012) conducted risk 
analysis of a header failure in LNG carriers. Li and Tang (2019) proposed a structural risk 
analysis model based on Bayesian belief network (BBN) to assess the risk of hull girder 
collapse of a membrane LNG carrier after grounding. Sultana et al. (2019) assessed the 
feasibility of replacing conventional HAZOP analysis with a method called System 
Theoretical Process Analysis (STPA). The study further compared the results from applying 
STPA and conventional HAZOP analysis to ship-to-ship transfer system of LNG.  
3.5.2 LNG terminals and stations 
Shindo et al. (2000) developed an approach by combining FTA and ETA for risk analysis of 
a networked chemical plant. The validity of the approach was tested by applying it to assess 
the risks of LNG receiving terminal. Ochiai et al. (2005) applied the ASME’s risk-based 
maintenance concept to quantitatively analyse the risks of LNG terminal. Ronza et al. (2006) 
presented a methodology for performing quantitative r sk analysis on marine hydrocarbon 
terminals sited in harbours. Spitzenberger (2009) used comparative risk assessment approach 
to assess four different pipe-in-pipe alternatives for loading line design of LNG liquefaction 
offshore jetty system. Yun et al. (2009) estimated the potential risks of LNG terminals using 
LOPA. Chin and Saetren (2010) presented the results of a detailed risk analysis for an LNG 
export loading operation at a Jetty. Chu et al. (2013) developed a risk prediction model for 
LNG terminal station using the information diffusion theory. Sun et al. (2013) applied CFD 
simulations based on NFPA 59A (2013) to conduct risk a sessment for most likely spill 
scenarios at LNG terminals/stations. Aneziris et al. (2014) presented an integrated risk 
assessment model for LNG terminals. Chu et al. (2014) assessed the risk of fire in LNG 
terminal stations using the information diffusion model. Vianello and Maschio (2014b) 
applied a quantitative risk assessment methodology t  a case study of an FSRU terminal. 
Hamedifar et al. (2015) provided an overview of quantitative risk analysis methods for LNG 
and LPG marine terminals and transportation projects in North America. Martinez and 
Lambert (2015) proposed a risk assessment framework to identify, screen and prioritise 
different sources of risks in an LNG storage terminal. George et al. (2019) applied FMECA 
method to assess the risks of LNG unloading facility n an LNG terminal in South India. 
Yoon et al. (2019) proposed a collaborative quantitative risk analysis framework and applied 
it to three large LNG import terminals. 
3.5.3 LNG offshore floating units 
Dogliani (2002) performed a safety assessment on an offshore LNG storage and 
regasification unit. Ballesio et al. (2009) assessed risk of subsea cryogenic pipeline design 
and concluded that the pipeline is technically feasible from safety and functional point of 
view. Skramstad et al. (2010) presented a risk-based verification approach for process 
systems on an FLNG producing unit. Benyessaad et al. (2013) presented a risk and safety 
analysis study for a new LNG floating unit project in the offshore LNG industry. Dan et al. 
(2014) applied a quantitative risk assessment method to evaluate the risk of fire and explosion 
in an LNG-FPSO. Martins et al. (2014) proposed a hybrid BN model to analyse the risk of 
LNG regasification system on board FSRU vessels. Yeo et al. (2016) developed an approach 
employing BN to perform dynamic safety analysis for offloading process in FLNG platforms. 
3.5.4 LNG plants 
Bozzolsco (2005) applied quantitative risk assessment at the early stages of a project to select 
site for the construction of LNG plant. Kim et al. (2005) employed FTA to identify and 
estimate the risks associated with membrane-type LNG storage tank. Kolodziej et al. (2009) 
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applied a concept risk assessment (CRA) technique to generic FLNG, Compressed Natural 
Gas (CNG), and Floating Gas to Liquids (FGTL) technology concepts by estimating the 
comparative risk measurement of Personnel Risk Exposure (PRE) and Cumulative Risk 
Factor (CRF). Raj and Lemoff (2009) discussed the risk evaluation approach incorporated 
into the mandatory annex in the 2009 edition of NFPA 59A (2013) and other possible 
approaches for conducting risk assessment on LNG facilities. Vinnem (2010) applied the 
Norwegian risk analysis approach to support risk-informed decision making in siting LNG 
facilities of urban areas in Norway. Tanabe and Miyake (2011) proposed an approach for 
functional safety requirement evaluation as a criterion for design of emergency systems. The 
approach was verified by applying it to an onshore LNG plant, in order to provide the risk 
reduction criteria and establish the design requirements for the emergency system. Keshavarz 
et al. (2012) developed a risk-based shutdown management strategy for LNG units. Khalil et 
al. (2012) presented a novel cascaded fuzzy-LOPA method for risk assessment in the natural 
gas industry. In Rathnayaka et al. (2012), a novel accident investigation model was 
developed using the System Hazard Identification and Prediction and Prevention (SHIPP) 
methodology. The methodology was tested and validated using LNG facility. Ahmed et al. 
(2015) developed a risk-based availability model using Markov method. The model was 
applied to evaluate the availability of gas sweetening unit of a natural gas plant. Mcinerney t 
al. (2014) proposed a new quantitative risk criteria for US LNG facilities. Vianello and 
Maschio (2014a) applied a quantitative risk assessmnt technique to analyse the risk of 
Italy’s high pressure natural gas distribution network. Vianello and Maschio (2014b) 
determined the safety and security risks of new and lternative technologies for LNG re-
gasification unit. Giardina and Morale (2015) applied an integrated FMECA and HAZOP 
methodology to analyse the risk of LNG storage facilities under construction in Porto 
Empedocle, Italy. Stavrou et al. (2016) employed a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) 
methodology for dynamic monitoring of risk of failures in LNG site operations. Renjith et al. 
(2018) applied fuzzy FMECA to assess the risks of LNG storage facilities. Baalisampang et 
al. (2019) proposed a framework and applied it to assess the risks of LNG processing plant 
considering accidental LNG release, including vaporisation, a pool fire and Vapour Cloud 
Explosion (VCE). Badida et al. (2019) applied a fuzzy FTA method to evaluate the risks of 
oil and natural gas pipelines. Kong et al. (2019) provided a vital guide for formulating energy 
policy aimed at assessing the risks associated with natural gas importation. 
4. Discussion of findings 
This paper provides an overview of risk analysis application in the LNG sector. A total of 66 
papers have been reviewed, comprising 47 journal articles and 19 conference proceedings.  
Figure 1 represented a bar chart showing the number of scientific works by year of 
publication. It was observed that literature on risk analysis application in the LNG sector has 
been growing in the last two decades with majority of the papers appearing during the last 
decade (2009– 2019). It can therefore be projected that more publications in this field of 
study may be expected in the next coming years. In Figure 2, the proposed framework 
underpinning the categorization of the state-of-the-art publications on risk analysis 
application in the LNG sector is introduced. To this end, the categories, listed in Section 2.2 
are used as the structure to further discuss the findings of the review. 
4.1 Risk analysis methods 
On comparing qualitative, quantitative and semi-qualitative risk analysis methods (Table 1), 
qualitative risk analysis methods which are considere  the quickest and the simplest, are least 
reported in literature among the three categories of risk analysis methods applied in the LNG 
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sector. This may imply that qualitative risk analysis methods are deficient in their application 
because of the high hazards in the LNG sector which can lead to catastrophic accidents 
resulting in injuries, fatalities, significant economic loss and reputation damage. It can also be 
observed from Table 1 that semi-qualitative risk asses ment methods which have advantage 
of compensating for the limitations of the both qualitative and quantitative methods is 
gradually gaining popularity in the LNG sector, although international regulations advocate 
for the use of quantitative risk assessment methods f r risk analysis in safety critical 
industries such as the LNG sector (CCPS, 1999; NFPA 59A, 2013). 
On comparing probabilistic and deterministic risk analysis methods (Table 1), it is not 
surprising that 46.8% of the studies have reported on the application of probabilistic methods 
as opposed to 43.5% for deterministic methods. Thisis because probabilistic risk assessment 
methods are suitable for evaluating the risk of complex engineering assets with multiple risks 
such as LNG facilities, nuclear plants and chemical processing plants (Tixier et al., 2002). 
Also, very few studies have utilized the hybrid probabilistic and deterministic methods for 
risk assessment in the LNG sector. 
Risk analysis methods continue to play a critical role throughout the life cycle of safety 
critical assets from design, construction, installaion, operation, maintenance to 
decommissioning. CRA approaches have some limitations and key amongst them is the 
inability to update risk analysis results when new information emerges. This has led to the 
development of DRA approaches with the potential of overcoming the limitations of the CRA 
approaches. DRA approaches are capable of dynamically updating risk analysis results when 
new information emerges. However, as can be seen in Table 2, significant number of studies 
continues to apply the CRAs during risk analysis in the LNG sector, regardless of the 
limitations. This means that a lot more research is required to demonstrate the capabilities 
and advantages of using DRA to practitioners and researchers.  
4.2 Risk analysis tools, output strategies and data sources 
It can clearly be seen from Table 3 that integrated risk analysis tools are the greatest 
contributor in literature as far as risk analysis application in the LNG sector is concerned. 
Although it is well established in literature that fuzzy based approaches can deal with 
uncertainties, vagueness and imprecisions associated with human judgement during risk 
assessment, the result indicates that less studies have applied fuzzy based approaches to 
support risk analysis in the LNG sector. 
Fuzzy risk analysis tools such as FER, fuzzy-LOPA, fuzzy-TOPSIS, Fuzzy Inference 
System (FIS) and fuzzy-based FMEA/FMECA are some fuzzy based approaches developed 
for risk analysis in the LNG sector, whereas ETA, FTA, BN and CFD are some of the 
individual tools combined with others. This is not surprising because these tools are very 
suitable in tackling complex risk problems, and therefore, combining them with certain tools 
can help overcome the limitations of those tools by enhancing their performance. 
As can be seen from Table 3, expert judgment appears to be the most dominant source 
of data for risk analysis in the LNG sector. The implication of this finding is that there may 
be paucity of good quality data to support risk analysis in the LNG sector. Furthermore, when 
linking data sources to risk analysis tools, it is observed that most studies utilizing DRA 
approaches such BN and Monte Carlo simulation rely on information from data handbooks, 
technical reports and historical data for risk analysis. Thus, in order for the LNG sector to 
shift toward the use of DRA approaches for risk analysis, good quality data must be available 




The adoption of LNG as an environmentally friendly source of fuel across several industries 
has led to dramatic development of LNG infrastructure such as LNG carriers, LNG terminals, 
stations and jetties and onshore and offshore LNG processing facilities. Figure 3 represents a 
pie chart showing percentages of studies in relation o risk analysis in different LNG 
subsectors.  
Figure 3. Distribution of papers according to their application areas in the LNG sector. 
As shown in Figure 3, the LNG carriers and LNG fuelled ships sector with 21 reported 
studies has received the most attention in the LNG sector, followed by LNG plants (19), 
terminals and stations (15) and LNG offshore floating units (7).  
The statistics above indicate wide acceptance of LNG as an alternative environmentally 
friendly fuel with the potential of reducing emissions compared to conventional fuels. Thus, a 
number of ships are now handling LNG as cargo or fuel or running shipboard machinery. 
This may have accounted for the increase in number of papers reporting on risk assessment 
for LNG carriers and LNG fuelled ships. According to Animah et al. (2018), the use of LNG 
by ships as an alternative fuel is considered as one of the most viable ways ships can comply 
with the strict emission requirements set out by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO). On another hand, the increase in LNG infrastructure will mean that assets and 
personnel working in the LNG sector will be exposed increased health and safety risks. Thus, 
stakeholders must make conscious effort to enhance the safety of LNG facilities through the 
application of proven risk analysis methodologies.  
5. Conclusions 
The use of risk analysis has contributed to accident prevention as well as enhancing the safety 
and reliability of critical systems in the LNG sector over the past two decades. In this paper, 
we have reviewed 66 international journal articles and conference papers published between 
January 2000 and June 2019 about the application of risk analysis in the LNG sector. Based 
on the current practices in the LNG sector, we proposed a comprehensive classification 
framework according to risk analysis methods, risk analysis tools, output/strategy, data 
sources and application.  
The proposed classification framework covered more aspects of risk analysis process 
compared with the existing review articles on risk analysis which classified scientific 
literature according to only risk assessment methods. Thus, this paper reveals the holistic 
issues and future perspectives on application of risk analysis in the LNG sector. Our 
classification scheme will not only help researchers and practitioners to identify and classify 
potential risk factors in the LNG sector but can also serve as a starting point in risk decision-
making, since it provides useful insights on the type of risk analysis method, risk assessment 
tool, and the data sources may be applicable for a particular case. 
The review of scientific literature revealed that the number of publications on risk 
analysis application in the LNG sector is gradually increasing, with the year 2014 recording 
the highest number of publications. In spite of remarkable progress in the application of risk 
analysis in the LNG sector, there are still opportunities for further research in this area of 
study. Some of the potential future research directions are provided below: 
1. There is clear research gap in the area of risk assessment type, where approximately 71% 
of the published literature on LNG risk analysis have used conventional type of risk 
assessment as opposed to 29% which have employed dynamic risk assessment.  
2. The difficulty in obtaining good quality real-life data has been expressed by researchers 
as one of the key challenges in relation to conducting risk analysis in safety critical 
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industries (Berle et al., 2013). The introduction of electronic data collection platforms in 
different industries including the LNG sector can provide a solution to this problem. 
Electronic data collection platforms have the capability of providing decision makers 
with good quality data for the right decision. 
3. Though Petri net and Markov chain are two powerful quantitative risk assessment tools, 
this review revealed that very few papers have report d using these methods for risk 
analysis in the LNG sector. Therefore, future research on risk analysis in the LNG sector 
can use these methods. 
4. Our findings indicated that few attempts have been made to use MCDM methods to 
solve risk-based problems in the LNG sector. Therefore, there is a critical need to 
develop MCDM methods which can take into account enviro mental, safety, economic 
and social issues into risk-based decision making. MCDM has the capability of 
overcoming the limitations of some risk analysis methodologies.  
5. The trend towards the development of more efficient integrated risk analysis tools 
(combining techniques) to evaluate risk of complex and dynamic assets such as LNG 
plants is growing steadily. We suggest that these tools should be further developed to 
incorporate sensitivity analysis to deal with uncertainties associated risk analysis in the 
LNG sector.  
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Table 1. Distribution of the papers utilizing risk analysis methodologies. 
Reference Qualitative  Quantitative  Semi-qualitative Probabilistic Deterministic  Hybrid Deterministic-Probabilistic 
Shindo et al. (2000) √    √  
Dogliani (2002)   √   √ 
Bozzolsco (2005)  √  √   
Kim et al. (2005)  √  √   
Ochiai et al. (2005)  √   √  
Ronza et al. (2006)  √  √   
Han et al. (2008)  √   √  
Vanem et al. (2008)   √   √ 
Ballesio et al. (2009) √    √  
Kolodziej et al. (2009)  √   √  
Raj and Lemoff (2009)  √  √   
Spitzenberger (2009)  √  √   
Yun et al. (2009)   √ √   
Chin and Saetren (2010)   √   √ 
Nwaoha et al. (2010)  √   √  
Montewka et al. (2010)  √  √   
Skramstad et al. (2010) √    √  
Vinnem (2010)   √   √ 
Nwaoha et al. (2011)   √  √  
Tanabe and Miyake (2011)  √  √   
Keshavarz et al. (2012)  √   √  
Khalil et al. (2012)   √ √   
Li and Huang (2012)  √   √  
Rathnayaka et al. (2012)   √ √   
Roldán et al. (2012)   √ √   
Souza et al. (2012)  √  √   
Berle et al. (2013)  √  √   
Benyessaad et al. (2013)   √  √  
Chu et al. (2013)  √     
Nwaoha et al. (2013)   √  √  
Sun et al. (2013)  √   √  
Aneziris et al. (2014)   √ √   
Chu et al. (2014)  √     
Dan et al. (2014)  √  √   
Devkaran (2014)  √  √   
Elsayed et al. (2014)   √  √  
Melani et al. (2014)   √   √ 
Martins (2014)  √  √   
Noh et al. (2014)  √  √   
Vianello and Maschio 
(2014a) 
 √   √  
Vianello and Maschio 
(2014b) 
 √  √   
Ahmed et al. (2015)  √  √   
Hamedifar et al. (2015)   √ √   
Giardina and Morale (2015)   √  √  
Lee et al. (2015)  √  √   
Martinez and Lambert 
(2015) 
  √  √  
Zhao et al. (2015)   √ √   
Fu et al. (2016)  √  √   
Jewitt (2016)  √   √  
Martins et al. (2016)  √  √   
Yeo et al. (2016)   √ √   
Stavrou et al. (2016)   √  √  
Ahn et al. (2017)   √  √  
Jeong et al. (2017)  √  √   
Hogelin et al. (2018) √    √  
Renjith et al. (2018)   √  √  
Baalisampang et al. (2019)   √ √   
Badida et al. (2019)   √  √  
George et al. (2019)   √  √  
Leoni et al. (2019)   √   √ 
Li and Tang (2019)  √  √   
Kong et al. (2019)   √  √  
Sultana et al. (2019) √    √  
Yoon et al. (2019)  √   √  
Table 2. Distribution of the papers utilizing conventional and dynamic risk analysis. 
Year  No Conventional  No Dynamic 
2000 1 (Shindo et al., 2000) 0  
2001   0  
2002 1 (Dogliani, 2002) 0  
2003 0  0  
2004 0  0  
2005 3 (Bozzolsco, 2005; Kim et al., 2005; Ochiai et 
al., 2005) 
0  
2006 1 (Ronza et al., 2006) 0  
2007 0  0  
2008 2 (Han et al., 2008; Vanem et al., 2008) 0  
2009 3 (Ballesio et al., 2009; Kolodziej et al., 2009; 
Spitzenberger, 2009) 
1 (Yun et al., 2009) 
2010 2 (Skramstad et al., 2010; Vinnem, 2010) 2 (Chin and Saetren, 2010; 
Montewka et al., 2010) 
2011 2 (Nwaoha et al., 2011; Tanabe and Miyake, 
2011) 
0  
2012 6 (Keshavarz et al., 2012; Khalil et al., 2012; Li 
and Huang, 2012; Rathnayaka et al., 2012; 
Roldán et al., 2012; Souza et al., 2012) 
0  
2013 3 (Benyessaad et al., 2013; Chu et al., 2013; 
Nwaoha et al., 2013) 
2 (Berle et al., 2013; Sun et al., 
2013) 
2014 6 (Aneziris et al., 2014; Dan et al., 2014; 
Devkaran, 2014; Elsayed et al., 2014; Vianello 
and Maschio, 2014a, 2014b) 
3 (Martins et al., 2014; Melani 
et al., 2014; Noh et al., 2014) 
2015 5 (Ahmed et al., 2015; Giardina and Morale, 
2015; Hamedifar et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2015; 
Martinez and Lambert, 2015) 
1 (Zhao et al., 2015) 
2016 3 (Fu et al., 2016; Jewitt, 2016; Martins et al., 
2016) 
2 (Stavrou et al., 2016; Yeo et 
al., 2016) 
2017 2 (Ahn et al., 2017; Jeong et al., 2017) 0  
2018 2 (Hogelin et al., 2018; Renjith et al., 2018) 0  
2019 6 (Baalisampang et al., 2019; Badida et al., 2019; 
George et al., 2019; Kong et al., 2019; Sultana 
et al., 2019; Yoon et al., 2019) 
2 (Leoni et al., 2019; Li and 









Table 3. Output, analysis tools and data sources 
Ref Output/strategy Tools applied Data sources 
Shindo et al. (2000) Risk assessment Combination of FTA and ETA - 
Dogliani (2002) Safety analysis Application of IGC code - 
Bozzolsco (2005) Site selection and 
plant layout 
Software tool - 
Kim et al. (2005) Risk assessment  FTA Generic data  
Ochiai et al. (2005) Risk assessment  API and ASME quantitative 
risk evaluation method 
- 
Ronza et al. (2006) Risk assessment ETA Historical data 
Han et al. (2008) Risk assessment  - 
Vanem et al. (2008) Risk assessment  ETA Historical data, published 
damage statistics and expert 
judgement 
Ballesio et al. (2009) Risk assessment  Check list and FMEA Expert knowledge and 
Engineering judgement  
Kolodziej et al. 
(2009) 
Risk assessment Concept risk assessment 
(CRA) model 
General arrangement 
drawings and a 3D 
CADView model 
Spitzenberger (2009) Risk assessment ETA and PHAST simulation 
software  
Historical data 
Yun et al. (2009) Risk assessment Bayesian–LOPA OREDA database 
Chin and Saetren 
(2010) 
Risk assessment BN Expert judgement  
Montewka et al. 
(2010) 
Risk assessment  Non-linear finite element 
method (FEM) and BN 
Historical data 
Nwaoha et al. (2010) Risk based 
maintenance 
Genetic algorithm  Literature review 




Expert technical assessment 
and literature review 
-
Nwaoha et al. (2011) Risk assessment Combination of the FSA 
methodology and fuzzy 
evidential reasoning (FER) 
Expert judgement 
Tanabe and Miyake 
(2011) 
Risk reduction IEC 61508 and 61511 Historical data 




Parameter estimation OREDA database 
Khalil et al. (2012) Risk assessment Cascaded-fuzzy-LOPA Data obtained from PHA 
along with that from the look 
up tables. 
Li and Huang (2012) Risk assessment  Dow method, BLEVE model 
and VCE model 
- 
Rathnayaka et al. 
(2012) 
Accident modelling  Combination of FTA and ETA Historical data 
Roldán et al. (2012) Risk assessment FTA and cause-consequence 
diagram 
OREDA and UK HSE 
databases  
Berle et al. (2013) Risk assessment  Monte Carlo simulation Expert judgment 
Benyessaad et al. 
(2013) 
Risk and safety 
studies 
Design risk assessment 
flowchart 
Historical data 
Chu et al. (2013) Risk assessment Information diffusion theory - 
Nwaoha et al. (2013) Hazards ranking in 
LNG carrier 
operations  
Risk matrix and fuzzy 
evidential reasoning (FER) 
method and FTA 
Expert judgement 
Sun et al. (2013) Risk assessment CFD  Experimental data 
Aneziris et al. (2014) Risk assessment Parameter estimation, ETA 
and FTA 
OREDA database 
Dan et al. (2014) Risk assessment ETA and PHAST software E&P Forum and OGP data  
Devkaran (2014) Risk assessment Risk assessment calculation in 
line with international 
- 
standards (IEC 62305) 
Elsayed et al. (2014) Risk assessment  Fuzzy-TOPSIS Expert Judgement 
Melani et al. (2014) Risk assessment Cause-Consequence Diagram 
and BN 
OREDA and UK HSE 
databases 
 Martins et al. (2014) Risk assessment  Hybrid BN - 
Noh et al. (2014) Risk-based 
information 
Dynamic process simulation 





Risk assessment ETA Generic data 
Vianello and 
Maschio (2014b) 
Risk assessment ETA and PHAST software  Generic data 
Ahmed et al. (2015) Risk-based 
availability 
estimation 
Markov method Available plant 
data and OREDA database 
Hamedifar et al. 
(2015) 
Risk assessment  Modelling  Historical data 
Giardina and Morale 
(2015) 
Safety analysis Integrated FMECA and 
HAZOP 
Data from risk analysis 
database software 
Lee et al. (2015) Risk assessment  ETA and CFD Actual navigation data and 
UK HSE database 
Zhao et al. (2015) Risk assessment BN Experts’ judgement 
Fu et al. (2016) Risk assessment Integrated ETA and CFD China ac demy of safety 
science and technology 
Jewitt (2016)  Safety design 
analysis 
CFD - 
Martins et al. (2016) Risk assessment PHAST Risk software - 
Yeo et al. (2016) Risk assessment   BN Generic data 
Stavrou et al. (2016) Dynamic risk failure 
monitoring 
Fuzzy Inference System  Experimental data  
Ahn et al. (2017) Risk-based design  Fuzzy-based FMEA Reliability data 
Jeong et al. (2017) Identify potential 
risks of LNG 
bunkering 
Bespoke IQRA software DNV frequency failure 
datasheets 
Hogelin et al. (2018) Safety and corrosion 
protection 
Risk Assessment Process 
Flowchart 
Historical data 
Renjith et al. 
(2018) 
Risk assessment Fuzzy FMECA Expert judgement 
Baalisampang et al. 
(2019) 
Consequence 
modelling and risk 
assessment 
Grid based approach Expert judgement 
Badida et al. 
(2019) 
Risk assessment  Fuzzy FTA Expert judgement 
George et al. 
(2019) 
Risk assessment Fuzzy FMECA Expert judgement 
Leoni et al. (2019) Optimization of 
maintenance time 
schedule 
BN Combination of literature 
and experts judgement. 
Li and Tang (2019) Risk assessment BBN Statistical data 
Sultana et al. 
(2019) 
Hazard analysis System Theoretical Process 
Analysis (STPA) 
Expert judgement 
Yoon et al. (2019) Risk assessment  Collaborative QRA LNG equipment reliability 
data book of Korea gas 









Figure 1. Distribution of the number of papers over the past two decades. 
 









































Figure 3. Distribution of papers according to their application areas in the LNG sector. 















 To systematically review the published literature about risk analysis in the LNG 
sector. 
 To identify various applications of risk analysis in LNG carriers, LNG fuelled ships, 
LNG terminals and stations, LNG offshore floating units, LNG plants, etc.   
 To analyse the state-of-the-art of risk analysis strategies, methods, tools and 
techniques in the LNG sector. 
 To identify application areas and data sources (OREDA handbook, published 
literature, UK HSE databases, regulatory agencies’ r ports, industry datasets, and 
experts’ consultations) to apply risk analysis to the LNG sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
